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THOSE WHO OCCUPIED positions of financial responsibility in
orporate management during the World War I era, the record pre-
ented in this paper wilt bring meniories of feverish financing ex-
eriences, which up to mid-1926 were more often profitable than
nprofitable but were decidedly the reverse in the latter half of 1920
nd in 1921. These experiences undoubtedly left a deep impression,
,hich affected attitudes and policies for years to come. To those
those financial responsibility began at a later date, the record pro-
ides insight into a period rich in financial lessons.
This study has a single objective: to show simply, directly, and as
omprehensively as available data permit, how economic develop-
aents of the World War I era affected the finanéial structure—assets,
jabilities and net worth—of manufactuiing and trade enterprise.
To one thinks that history repeats itself in detail, but a survey of
his nearest parallel to the World War II period can be useful in
bserving and interpreting current economic tendencies.
Facts on financial structure are only the trees, and not the forest
tself. Therefore this study opens with a general review intended to
mAine the over-all financing tendencies of World War I as re-
ealed in detail in the subsequent analysis. A comparison with
nancing tendencies in World War II is also presented, but only in
ummary fashion. Thorough examination of the way in which the
nancial structure of business enterprise has reacted to the demands
I the current war is reserved for a later paper in the present series.
The seven-year period that followed the outbreak of World War
has been regarded, for simplicity of treatment, as consisting of
Liree major phases: the financial expansion of the war years, ig 15-
1
ai8; the postwar financial expansion, 1919-20; arid the postwar finar
cial contraction, 1921. To set the wartime record in perspectiv
comparisons are briefly made, so far as the data permit, with finar
cial experience before and after the war period, particularly wit
the two peacetime periods of financial expansion, 192 2-29 and
37, and with the two peacetime liquidations of 1930-32 and 1938.
The historical data available to us for tracing the financial e>
perience of enterprise during the World War I era are far less con
plete than one would wish. They consist only of annual financi2
statements of comparatively small samples of manufacturing an
trade companics in two size groups —largecompanies (over $
milliontotal assets) and medium and small companies ($50 thoi.
sand to $5 million total assets).
The large corporation samples probably account for about 10 pei
cent of the number of large corporations in these fields in 192C
and for about 20 percent of the total assets held by them. But th
samples of medium and small corporations include altogether onl
a few hundred out of a total number of more than 70,000, and thu
represent only a minor fraction of the total assets of manufacturin
and trade corporations in this size class. All available evidence u
lating to the World War I period indicates that the financial b
havior of medium and small companies contrasted in many respect
with that of large corporations, and our samples of medium an
small concerns display such a contrast.
The samples were collected for the most part in connection wit:
the Financial Research Program's Studies in Business Financing
one of which deals with changes in the financial structure of mant
facturing and trade enterprise since the turn of the century. Apper
dix A, which dIscusses the methods and limitations of the presen
study, describes the samples in detail.
The charts and tables that illustrate the detailed discussion ar
based on aggregate financial sta[ements for the samples. Thi
method, although subject to well-known limitations, was adoptec
first, because of its simplicity, second, because of interest in the ovei
all financing tendencies of business enterprise, and third, becaus
our records suffice to describe only the general contours of wartim
changes in financial structure in manufacturing and trade. Aggn
gate balance sheet data and selected income statement data are
sented in Appendix B.
2'lANCING TENDENCIES, WORLD WAR I —AREVIEW
obably the most powerful influence affecting the financial cx-
rience of corporate enterprise over the 1915-21 period was the
inflation of prices and the postwar price collapse. Over the
-year period following the outbreak of war, the wholesale price
more than doubled, and then during a single year it declined
re than one-third. Business accounts clearly mirrored the ware
ic inflation and postwar deflation of prices and, what is more
nificant, they reflected the changing attitudes and policies of
rporate management, which were among the strategic elements
the inflation and deflation process.
For six months prior to the outbreak of World War I, business
:ivity in the United States had receded, and the immediate effect
the European conflict was to accelerate this recession. Within a
ir, however, revival succeeded recession, and domestic recovery
tes were strongly reinforced by an inflow of orders from abroad,
)ecially from belligerents for military supplies. Idle productive
Dacity was quickly reemployed, and corporate earnings and re-
irces in manufacturing and trade began a rise that continued
rough 1920. Per annum rates of growth in business asset invest-
mt attained levels higher than those in any of the three prewar
pansions (1904-07, 1908-10, and 1911-13) or in either of the peace-
ne expansions that followed (1922-29 and 1933-37).
Atthe outset of wartime revival, current or working assets were
atively scarce, fixed assets abundant. The financing problem of
inufacturing and trade enterprise was therefore to provide work-
assets, and the problem was soon accentuated bythe advance Of
ices. For enterprise in both fields the increase in working assets—
tentory, receivables, cash and marketable securities—was excep-
nally rapid. The growth of such assets in proportion to total
ets was especially marked during the war years proper, and was
)re noteworthy among large corporations than among medium
:1 small concerns.
The increase in the book value of inventory over the war and
;twar expansions (1915-20) reflected in part the effects of rising
ces and in part larger holdings of physical stocks, both on hand
I in transit. Inventory turnover, i. e., the dollar volume of inven-
y inrelation to sales, declined through the war years for large
npanies as well as for medium and small concerns, suggesting that
'3protective and speculative inventory buying, induced by the pr:
rise, and by transportation bottlenecks, exerted a cumulative
flationary influence On wholesale prices. After the war the invent
turndver of large corporations continued to decline, but that of t
smaller companies moved upward. On the whole, inventory ao
mulation—by both large and smaller companies during the
years proper, and especially by the larger companies in the pc
war years—appears to have been a strong factor in the financial i
pansionsof igi 5'-20. Concerning the postwar years, price advani
and shipment delays aggravated inventory speculation and p
yoked duplicate ordering on an exceptionally wide scale.
The wartime increase in dollar inventory helped to swell c
porate profits because, as long as wholesale prices rose, the th
prevalent methods of inventory accounting in manufacturing a
trade generated unrealized book income as a result of the lag 1
tween the time of purchase and the time of sale of inventory. Th
methods, though based on averages of inventory cost, more nea
approximated the first-in, first-out("fifo") method of invent(
valuation than any other. A substantial proportion of large co
panies made provision, through the establishment of special inv
tory reserves, for book losses that were bound to occur if the w
time price advance were converted by the cessation of hostilit
into a decline, but in general these reserves were inadequate
meet the contingency of such a drastic price recession as occuri
in 1920-21. A few of the more conservatively financed compani
e. g., the U. S. Steel and International Harvester Corporatio
valued inventories in reports to stockholders at prewar prices a
carried the difference between these values and cost as inventc
reserves.
The growth in manufacturing and trade sales during the v
years was accompanied by an increase in trade receivables, but 1
increase of other quick assets —cashand marketable securities —S
even greater, and thus the liquidity of quick assets increased. D
ing the war years the rise in the cash balances of manufacturing a
trade corporations appears to have been somewhat more rapid tli
the increase in demand deposits of banks, largely because of
creased cash balances among the large enterprises; but in the p
war years cash balances increased at about the same rate as(
culatingdeposits. And marketable securities, which were a
4)le proportion of business assets in 1914, expanded during the
in period of American war borrowing (1917-18) into a signifi-
it item both for larger and smaller companies. Much of this in-
;tment •was of course a patriotic response to the Liberty Loan
Lves and did not reflect a deliberate policy of building up cor-
rate liquidity by investment in marketable securities. Large
inufacturing companies liquidated marketablesecuritiesin
19-20, and large trade companies did so in 1920, and from all
evidence this liquidation was large enough to help weaken the
irket for government obligations in these years; prices of govern-
bonds fell slightly toward the end of 1919 and sharply in the
'ly part of 1920. Some companies built up holdings of marketable
unties while others were liquidating; this seems to have been
rticularly true of smaller concerns in manufacturing and trade.
The expansion in wartime production, which was stimulated by
r orders, by increased consumer incomes and by rising prices,
)mpted both manufacturing and trade enterprise to add new
tnt facilities. Not all of the plant expansion of the war years is vis-
e in accounting records, for in war industries some contracts pro-
led for the cost of special new facilities to be financed by contract
vances. Prior to our entry into the war, European belligerents
anced plant expansion in this way, obtaining a large part of the
rids advanced from proceeds of security sales in American mar-
ts. Some plant expansion was covered under war contracts of our
rngovernment,1917-18. Each of our samples had smaller pen
itage additions to fixed property in 1918 than in 1917—a conse-
ence of war priorities and shortages—but there was some revival
fixed property additions in i 919andan extremely sharp expan-
n in 1920. The average annual rate of investment in fixed prop-
:y (increase, net of depreciation as shown by corporate accounts)
tween the end of 1918 and the end of 1920, and the average ratio
fixed property expenditure to the property accoUnt for those two
irs, were the highest attained between 1915 and 1937—a period
:luding two wartime expansions (1915-18 and 1919-20) and two
acetime expansions (1922-29 and 1933-37).
For large companies the annual rate of investment in plant and
uipment was lower, on the average, during the war years proper
an during the expansion years of the '2os; for the smaller com-
nies this rate was higher during the war years than in the '20S.
5Over the expansion years of the '30s, on the other hand, all c
samples except large trade corporations showed declines in ph
and equipment account.
Granting that our wartime data are incomplete, it ne.verthel
seems that the increased output of military supplies was acco
pushed without abnormally large additions to manufacturing fac
ties financed by war industry itself, especially if allowance is ma
for the inflated building and equipment costs of this period. Mo
over, such additions as there were apparently did not seriously
terfere with plant expansion among manufacturing and trade
terprises serving consumers. The expansion of plant facilities
19 19-20 was clearly a response to the outburst of postwar consun
spending in this country, to an unprecedented influx of orders fr
world markets, and to business optimism that these developmei
engendered at prevailing and prospective price levels. In additi(
the modernization of facilities became desirable as an aid to ma
taming the high wage rates that had been established during
years. To judge from our samples, most of the wartime additic
to the book value of fixed property accounts, however much
Hated by abnormal costs, were carried over into the '205 at c
less depreciation, without special postwar write-downs. Howev
some postwar 'write-downs were taken on war-built plant and equ
ment, after individual companies had established the econon
obsolescence of such facilities, as permitted under wartime corpor;
income tax laws.
The postwar indrease in the fixed property expenditures of mar
facturing and trade enterprise has been interpreted as representii
in significant part, replacement deferred during war years. The
counting records for our samples suggest that on the whole su
corporations spent their depreciation and depletion accruals I
replacement during the war period proper. The postwar
sion in plant facilities seems to have represented deferred repla
ment only to a small degree; to a much greater extent it develoF
because going concerns launched new business projects, some
which had been planned during the war years and deferred, soi
of which were newly conceived ve°ntures. Among railroads, hc
ever, deferred replacement was probably of considerable imp
tance, and their postwar expenditures for deferred replacement a
property betterments undoubtedly swelled the demand for the o
.6of manufacturing industry and, indirectly, for trade services
s well.
Manufacturing and trade companies as a whole earned more and
aved more in the wartime expansions than in the succeeding peace-
ime expansions: a much larger proportion of these corporations
eported profits to the Treasury during the war and postwar a-
than in the expansion period of the later '205 or that of
he '305. After the second year of the war,,profits after taxes tended
o decline in relation to sales, but in relation to net worth they
eached higher average levels than in the interbellum expansions.
1916corporatetaxes took a large part of net income, claim-
rig in 1918asmuch as 45 percent of manufacturing profits and
)ercent of trade profits.
While retained earnings were an important source of funds for
inancing asset investment, external sources were also relied upon
reavily. Short-term debt, a large part of which was bank debt, was
he chief external source during the 1915-18 expansion for both
he larger and the smaller companies represented in the samples
ye have observed; but in the postwar expansion sales of stocks and
)onds exceeded in importance short-term debt as an external source
f funds. In general, however, fixed asset investment was financed
retained earnings plus sales of new securities—stocks or bonds;
,nd short-term debt, where relied upon, was confined to financing
dditions to working assets. In this respect the financing of wartime
sset expansion was consistent with accepted standards of prudence.
[here were exceptions, perhaps too numerous as events turned out;
ur samples in each year had a few companies that financed part of
heir long-term investment needs by means of short-term debt.
The rapid expansion of bank deposits that occurred during the
ears 1915-20 was closely paralleled by the growth of bank loans.
iccording to national bank figures, loans to manufacturing and
rade enterprise constituted nearly half of the bank loans outstand-
rig at the end of 1920. It seems clear, therefore, that increased bor-
Dwing by manufacturing and trade was a factor of considerable
iiportance in the inflation of bank credit during the war and post-
tar periods. There are indicitions also that during the 1915-20
eriod the greater reliance on bank debt characterized the large
Drporations more than the smaller concerns. Over the entire six-
ear period, there apparently was a considerable increase in
7the total number of small and medium-size companies that owed
debt to banks, but only a moderate rise in the average amount ol
such debt; on the other hand, the increase in the total number ol
large corporations that owed debt to banks was probably small, bul
the average amount of notes payable increased greatly.
One of the striking features of corporate financial behavior it
manufacturing and trade during i 915-18 is the extent of the
in balance sheet relationships that in prewar years had come to be re
garded as "normal." The first departures froM prewar rule-of-thuml
standards were undoubtedly 'viewed as "temporary and essentiai
expedients," but they were soon crystallized by the
of national war finance and by the process of wartime price inflation
While the new pattern of balance sheet relationships re
flected elements of strength—larger holdings of cash, marketable se
curities and receivables, and even increased working capital —.italst
reflected elements of weakness, such as higher book values of in
ventory, unprotected by adequate reserves for price recession, anc
gTeatly augmented short-term debt in the form of notes and ac
counts payable.
During the war years changes of this sort were more marked ii
the case of the iaige corporations. They were the enterprises t
incur the stronger impact of wartime expansion pressures, and the"
were in a position to command promptly the large amounts o
credit needed to finance wartime asset expansion, particularly thi
expansion of current assets. But financial expansion by medium
size and small enterprises was likewise greatly stimulated in th
early phase of the war period, and these companies too showe
marked changes in balance sheet proportions from prewar yean
The story of financial experience in manufacturing and trad
during the poStwar boom of 1919-20 is one of accelerated growth ii
business assets and liabilities. For a time after the Armistice, man'
business leaders anticipated a substantial recession in wholesal
•prices and were hesitant in undertaking forward
Both consumer and producer markets, however, received suppor
from various sources: for example, the continued military expendi
tures of the Federal government; expenditures of bonuses and
ings of discharged soldiers; expenditures of abnormal cash balance
by industry and trade to maintain current operations and to mak
postwar readjustments; the expenditure of funds for special pm
8oses, obtained by business enterprises and ultimate consumers
hrough the liquidation of Liberty Bond holdings; and the expendi-
ure by foreign nations of accumulated dollar balances, of proceeds
rom new foreign loans, and of intergovernmental advances from
he United'States.
Although wholesale prices sagged in the first quarter of 1919.
heyfailed to decline seriously as a whole, and soon began to move
ipward. This had a decisive effect on business expectations. As
:onsumer and business spending gathered force, business sentiment
urned buoyantly optimistic. Optimism was soon reinforced by
mprecedented demands from world markets, demands that car-
ied the dollar volume of exports and the balance of merchandise
rade to record levels for the .entire period between the two World
Nars. Three strategic financial elements helped to make these great
effective: first, the willingness of banks to renew loans
o borrowers with established lines of credit; second, the easy ac-
:ess to new bank and trade credits in domestic and foreign trade;
hird, the availability of the capital markets to private financing,
iow that the Treasury war financing program was ended and the
:ontrol of the Capital Issues Committee relaxed.
Postwar sales of large manufacturing companies were well sus-
ained in 1919-20,especiallyby heavy export demands, but sales of
rade and of medium and small manufacturing corporations moved
harply upward, mainly in response to the heavy wave of consumer
)uying financed from savings, bonuses, and current income. The
Lccompanying financial prosperity of large trade companies and
)f thousands of the country's smaller enterprises was probably a
najor stimulant in the 1919-20investmentboom. It is significant
hat the proportion of manufacturing and trade corporations re-
)orting profits was higher ii' 1919thanin any other year of the
!ntire periodi914-39. Furthermore,there were fewer business
ailures in 1919and1920,anda higher ratio of new business enter7
)rises to discontinued enterprises, than in any other years from the
)utbreak of World War Ito the end of i
It seems justifiable to say that while the financial expansion of
.915-18 was accentuated by the sustained response of large manu-
àcturing corporations to wartime production and price stimuli,
he expansion of 1919-20 wasintensified by the response of large
rade companies, and of the majority of medium and small com-
9panies in both manufacturing and trade, to a price, market, am
transport situation that was especially stimulating to them. The fac
that in 1918 there was a check to the expansion of plant and equip
ment facilities in trade and in medium and small manufacturing
plus the fact that the war years 1915-18 had been a time of higi
profits, high corporate savings and rapid working capital growth
combined to produce the needed financial flexibility among al
sizes of concerns to take advantage of diversified demands, domesti
and foreign, after the war.
For most manufacturing and trade concerns 1920 was a year a
profitable operation, but by mid-year business activity and price
had passed their crest, and by the end of the year demoralized corn
modity markets, widespread cancellation of orders, and mountin'
unemployment showed the acute financial distress of business er
terprise. For the year as a whole, however, financial accounts n
flected mainly a sharp expansion in resources; the effect of defl2
tion was not recorded until 192 i, when the current assets and deli
of many manufacturing and trade companies suffered drastic
age.
Although the financial distress of business concerns was only on
of many factors that contributed to the 1920-21 recession, there i
no doubt that the distress was severe and important. Several cor
siderations illustrate its intensity.
First is the severity of the fall recorded in wholesale and retai
prices. Between the middle of 1920 and the middle of 1921,th
span of a single year, a sharper and more rapid decline in whol
• sale prices occurred than over the three-year period of drastic d
fiation from the middle of 1929 to the middle of '932. Only farr
prices declined more severely in the latter and longer period tha
in 1920-21. The percentage decline in retail food prices and in th
cost of living was practically identical, judging from available it
dexes, for the two periods.
Second was the fact that falling prices imperilled commitmeni
on forward orders, commitments to buy of both manufacturers an
retailers, and commitments to sell of manufacturers. Postwar risin
prices, and the artificial shortages which. they precipitated, couple
with transportation bottlenecks, encouraged the practice of dupi
cate orders. When inventory stocks accumulated more rapidly tha
sales, cancellation of duplicate orders followed; and when it aj
10eared that deliveries were still in excess of needs, further cancel-
Ltions followed. Domestic cancellations quickly spread backward
om retailing, and as they gained force, receding prices brought
virtual avalanche of cancellations from international markets. In
1920, the committee on finance and currency of the
hamber of Commerce of the State of New York issued a report
eclaring: "The wve of cancellations of buying orders and repudia-
on of sale by buyers, which at present is sweeping the world and is
tenacing also the United States, has called forth, great concern in
usiness and banking circles."' Reputable concerns in, these circum-
:ances were confronted with a difficult choice. In many cases, en-
)rcement of contracts to sell meant the conversion of inventory
ito receivables of dubious collectibility, with the serious danger
mt the latter would shortly become bad debts. Commitments to
uy, on the other hand, involved a concern's credit standing in the
ade, future as well as present, and were not lightly repudiated by
companies. One large rubber éoncern, reorganized in
920, set up a reserve of $24 million to cover losses on its commit-
lents for future delivery. Manufacturing companies, whose post-
rar prosperity depended heavily on foreign orders, were especially
ulnerable in this situation.
A third indication of the severity of the 1920-21 recession is the
in the book value of inventory that resulted from sales
rid write-downs. For the large manufacturing and trade companies
in our samples, the percentage reduction for the single
ear 1921 was roughly four-fifths of the percentage decrease over
he three-year liquidation of 1930-3 2. Inventory write-downs of a
roup of 64 large manufacturing and trade companies for which
iformation is available totaled $344 million in 1920-22—for each
Drporation an average, of more than $5 million that disappeared
ito thin air. Such write-downs in 1920 amounted to i8 percent,
rid in i 921 to ipercent, of beginning-of-year book value. Cor-
orations that did not recognize the losses resulting from the col-
ipse of prices by means of inventory write-downs, nevertheless ex-
erienced them in the form of smaller operating profits or larger
perating losses arising fçom higher costs of goods sold.
Fourth is the fact that at the end of 1920 much of the swollen
Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, "Report of the Committee on
inance and Currency," Monthly Bulletin (December 1920)p.13.
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adollar inventory holdings were financed by short-term debt. It
true that a good deal of this. debt was legitimate by convention￿
credit standards (e. g., the rule of thumb that there should be tw
dollars of current assets for each dollar of current debt). Nonethi
less, about half of the companies represented in our samples ha
short-term indebtedness, including income tax accruals, that e
ceeded the highest amounts of "cash throw-off from operations
(net profit plus non-cash charges against income) in any one yea
of the entire war and postwar period 1915-20; and in some cas
the excess was substantial. It seems clear that many business cot
cerns, in following their accustomed practice of looking to futut
sales at the current price level for the liquidation of their shor
term indebtedness, failed to discount fully the possibility of a suc
den and drastic decline in prices that would prevent the full
tirement of outstanding debt from current transactions. The con
panies represented in our data, while they are not numerous, are a
concerns that survived both the liquidation of i 920 and the pn
longed depression of 1930-32; in other words, they represent di
more ably managed companies. Obviously, the debt problem face
by many imprudent and less well managed concerns must have bee
critical indeed, considering the commitment and inventory
tion at that time.
Given the exaggerated optimism occasioned by the fac
that no serious postwar recession in prices developed in 1919, an
by the prompt emergence of active demands for goods from dome
tic and world. markets, it was perhaps inevitable that prudence an
caution in financial management should have been thrown to di
winds in early postwar years. And when this attitude was combine
with the financial unbalance that had accumulated over four yeai
of war prosperity, it seems inevitable, from today's vantage poir
at least, that business assets in postwar years should have di
teriorated in quality as they increased in quantity, and that a sevei
financial crisis should sooner or later have resulted.
Considering the nature of the eventual crisis, its international
well as domestic basis, it could hardly have been avoided by an
makeshift policies of business, banking and government, conceive
and applied at the moment. Unfortunately, business departurc
from prudence in commitments to buy and sell, in inventory hoic
ings, and in short-term business debt had gone too far in too man
12Furthermore, the participation of manufacturing and trade
in the speculative excesses of the period was widespread;
i.certainindustries—of which automobiles, textiles, rubber, paper,
aailing and wholesaling were outstanding examples —financial
verextensions were numerous and conspicuous. Orders for goods
ere too often placed and accepted with a reckless disregard for the
involved. The ultimate liquidity of too many debt
)mmitments, however consistent with customary practice and with
ie commercial credit theory underlying the newly established Fed-
cal Reserve System, was solely dependent on impending transac-
ons at the inflated level of prices then prevailing; in other words,
)O few concerns took sufficient account of their future capacity to
debt from funds retained from operations in case short-term
iarket expectations failed to materialize. Lastly, too many business
reditors and debtors were unprepared to make debt adjustments
nce financial crisis was at hand; too few of them had anticipated the
ossibility of such a crisis, and too few debtors had refunded excess
debt in time, or converted it into equity. In brief, busi-
essmen, bankers, and public officials had simply raised their sights
a the future too high and in so doing had overlooked immediate
ealities. Nothing except a' different set of postwar business expecta-
ions, a less ambitious scale of business planning, and stricter ad-
erence to older standards of financial prudence could have altered
he result.2
Whether wartime taxes on corporate profits accentuated the war-
ime inflation of business debt, by reducing the funds available for
riternal financing or self-financing, is debatable. It is true that
igher profits after taxes, if not paid out in dividends, would have
iade it possible to expand corporate resources after the war with
reliance upon current debt; on the other hand, such a fiscal
olicy would have made it more profitable to "trade on equity"
y financing current operations with bank and trade credit. More-
ver, departures from pre-1914 business standards of balanced finan-
ial structure had gone far even before the United States entered the
iar, and it cannot be said with certainty today that untaxed profits
iould have been used to liquidate current debt.
Opinions will differ as to whether the abrupt liquidation of cur-
See in this connection Stdlla Stewart, Post-War Planning of World War I, U. S.
ureau of Labor Statistics, Historical Study No.(May 1943).
'3rent assets and short-term debt, given the inflated financial stru
ture of 1920, was desirable from the standpoint of the long-n
prosperity of the whole economy; and as to whether business entc
prise could have avoided participating so extensively in the postw;
accumulation of inventory, of current debt, and of forward cot
mitments to buy and sell. Business concerns were, of course, folio'
ing long-established practices of financing current operations, ar
their policies were formulated by executives whose experience 'di
not embrace a single period of drastic price deflation. Furthermor
the business contraction and price deflation of 1929-21 was moi
than a crisis of commitments, inventory and current debt; in
sponsible cancellation of orders and the heavy liquidation of ii
ventory and business debt seem mainly to have made the contra
tion more severe. Nevertheless, it was unfortunate that the
environment induced such widespread. disregard of financial pri
dence.
In drawing general conclusions from this paper, it should
borne in mind that only a limited segment of the economy is dea
with here, and only a few of the factors involved. Many elemen
other than those associated with the financing of manufacturin
and trade enterprise determined the course of the war period finai
cial expansion, and many other elements, international as well
domestic, operated to bring about the postwar liquidation. TF
difficulties that beset any effort to obtain a completely comprehei
sive view are so great, however, that use must be made of invest
gations of more limited scope. Only by comparing the views of
number of different observers will it be possible to develop tli
entire record of World War I and absorb fully the economic lessot
of that period.
FINANCING TENDENCIES, WORLD WAR II —
APRELIMINARY COMPARISON
Compared with the presentconflict, World War I was
Even in igi8, the year of greatest effort, probably only a little moi
than a fifth of the national product was devoted to war.
output made no serious inroads on civilian supplies untiF the secon
half of igi8, and by the end of that year hostilities had ceased an
demobilization was in full swing. But in i941, before the counti
was directly involved in World War II, one-tenth of the nation
14